






























6 Note that although for Lewis specifying a theoretical role for a term was supposed to go hand in hand 
with offering a functionalist assay of the T’s denotation, the two are separate moves. When T is a term 
appearing in a phenomenological theory, T’s theoretical role is the role it plays in an overall 
phenomenological, hence non-functional, characterization of T’s denotation. 
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	 This	approach	presupposes	that	there	is	sufficient	uniformity	among	people’s	respect	experiences,	something	that	may	well	be	called	into	question	(Gill	2008,	Sinnott-Armstrong	2008).	Certainly	there	may	be	little	uniformity	at	a	very	fine	grain	of	determinacy.	At	the	same	time,	one	might	hope	that	at	a	sufficient	level	of	generality,	certain	recurring	patterns	might	be	found	interpersonally,	such	that	even	if	different	subjects	find	it	difficult	to	produce	similar	phenomenological	descriptions	of	respect,	when	they	consume	phenomenological	descriptions	of	respect,	some	descriptions	simply	resonate	with	–	command	assent	from	–	many.		In	keeping	with	our	pudding	gambit,	here	we	will	assume	that	there	is	sufficient	uniformity	in	people’s	respect	experiences	to	make	it	possible	to	produce	descriptions	of	those	experiences	–	descriptions	which	do,	or	would,	command	widespread	assent.	The	challenge	is	how	to	characterize	the	common	component	of	felt	respect	for	persons	in	as	substantive	and	informative	a	manner.	Discussions	of	respect	for	persons	in	the	extant	literature	often	start	out	from	Kant’s	remarkably	influential	account	of	it.	Here	too,	however,	philosophers	have	tended	to	focus	on	the	functional	role,	rather	than	phenomenal	character,	Kant	assigned	to	respect.	We	believe,	however,	that	Kant’s	moral	writings	contain	fundamentally	accurate,	if	somewhat	incomplete,	characterizations	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	recognition-respect;	characterizations	that	can	be	more	fully	developed	and	defended	against	various	objections.	In	what	follows,	we	propose	to	build	on	Kant’s	insight	but	in	a	more	overtly	phenomenological	direction	than	is	common	in	the	extant	literature.	We	propose,	in	other	words,	to	develop	a	broadly	Kantian	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	for	persons.	This	task	will	occupy	us	for	the	next	two	sections.	In	the	final	section,	we	will	briefly	consider	some	outstanding	challenges,	pointing	the	way	for	further	research.7		   	
2.	Kant	on	the	Experience	of	Recognition-Respect:	I.	A	Footnote	in	the	
Groundwork		Kant’s	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	is	found	primarily	in	his	1797	Doctrine	of	Virtue	(part	II	of	the	Metaphysics	of	Morals),	where	he	discusses																																																									
7 Note well: we do not wish to claim that Kant’s only notion of respect is that of recognition-respect; on the 
contrary, we agree with Darwall (2008), that some of it concerns a kind of moral appraisal-respect. Thus, in 
the second Critique, Kant describes the feeling of respect one experiences upon witnessing the moral merit 
expressed in another’s action as “a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not” 
(KpV 5:77). Here the topic appears to be moral appraisal-respect. But the passages we will focus on in the 





8 The second conjunct in 6 is also phenomenological, but it appears to merely recapitulate 5. As for 1-3, 7-
8, and the first conjunct of 6, these appear to concern causal antecedents rather than phenomenal 
constituents of respect.  
9 Recall that appraisal respect is Darwall’s label for the kind of respect which contrasts with recognition-






















10 This contrast methodology is heavily used in current discussions of perceptual experience (see notably 





































14 Our continuation of the quoted remark is a gloss on the remainder of the sentence, which in full reads: “I 
keep myself within my own bounds so as not to detract anything from the worth that the other, as a human 
being is authorized to put upon himself.”  
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• Respect	as	acceptance,	too,	is	grounded	in	an	apprehension	of	the	other	as	equal	to	oneself	at	the	deepest	level.		
• It	is	also	grounded	in	full	appreciation	of	the	distinctness	or	otherness	of	the	other	–	the	fact	that	she	harbors	an	internal	life	which	is	ultimately	separate	from	one’s	own.		Finally,	there	are	also	two	phenomenological	observations	worth	making	about	an	affective	valence	involved	in	the	experience	of	respect:		
• Respect,	because	it	requires	subordinating	self-love	and	striking	down	self-conceit,	involves	a	negative	feeling	of	humility.		
• At	the	same	time,	because	it	involves	a	representation	of	one’s	equality	with	others,	respect	typically	involves	also	a	positive,	almost	cathartic	feeling	of	being	in	community	and	brotherhood	with	other	human	beings.		As	before,	in	order	to	capture	the	theoretical	role	of	recognition-respect	for	persons	in	the	theory,	we	may	construct	a	Ramsey	sentence	that	includes	these	observations	(plus	presumably	additional	ones)	asserting	the	existence	of	an	attitude	that	satisfies	all	or	most	of	these	elements.			 It	might	be	objected	that	our	portrait	of	respect	is	much	too	complex	and	over-intellectualizing,	casting	respect	as	an	incredibly	sophisticated	emotion	few	would	actually	be	able	to	experience.	In	response,	we	would	like	to	stress	two	points.	First,	and	most	importantly,	while	some	of	the	descriptors	just	used	deploy	high-level	concepts,	it	does	not	follow	that	a	person	needs	to	possess	the	relevant	concepts	to	just	experience	respect.	The	reason	is	that,	in	general,	a	person	need	not	be	in	a	position	to	articulate	and	accurately	conceptualize	every	experience	she	is	capable	of	undergoing.	Second,	however,	we	would	like	to	insist	that	recognition-respect	really	is	one	of	the	most	intellectual	emotions	in	the	standard	human	psychological	repertoire,	one	that	is	indeed	much	less	frequently	experienced	than,	say,	guilt	or	joy.		
4.	Outstanding	Challenges	and	Further	Research		We	have	attempted	to	offer	a	phenomenological	(first-personal)	rather	than	psychological	(third-personal)	characterization	of	Kantian	respect	for	persons,	as	it	comes	through	both	in	the	Groundwork	and	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue.	Naturally,	the	above	is	just	an	initial	sketch,	almost	an	illustration,	of	what	a	phenomenological	
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approach	to	respect	would	look	like.	We	want	to	close	with	discussion	of	three	major	challenges	to	the	project	that	may	open	fruitful	avenues	of	research	into	the	phenomenology	of	respect.			 The	first	and	most	straightforward	challenge	is	that	Kant’s	phenomenological	characterization	of	respect	is	inadequate.	In	particular,	several	scholars	have	argued	that	Kant	casts	respect	as	overly	abstract	and	intellectual.	One	immediate	worry	is	that	Kant	often	characterizes	respect	as	intentionally	directed,	in	the	first	instance,	not	at	persons	but	at	the	law,	and	to	that	extent	gets	wrong	the	intentional	content	of	respect	(Drummond	2006:	2).	As	Kant	himself	puts	it,	“every	respect	for	a	person	is	properly	only	respect	for	the	law	.	.	.	of	which	gives	us	an	example”	(G	4:401n).	In	response,	one	might	allow	that	respect	for	persons	is	intentionally	directed	at	persons	after	all,	but	is	so	directed	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the	law	(somewhat	as	an	auditory	perception	can	be	directed	at	a	bus	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the	sound	of	the	bus’s	engine).	Some	philosophers	have	charged,	however,	Kant’s	focus	on	respecting	persons	only	in	virtue	of	respecting	their	humanity,	or	only	in	virtue	of	their	exemplifying	the	law,	is	too	“cold”	and	impersonal.	The	problem	is	that	Kant’s	conception	of	respect	for	persons	fails	to	do	justice	to	a	commonsense	conception,	grounded	in	everyday,	ordinary	phenomenology,	according	to	which	respecting	persons	is	a	matter	of	having	an	attitude	toward	them	that	“takes	in”	the	wholeness	of	the	person	as	particular	agents	with	particular	aims,	interests,	and	concerns	(Noggle	1999).	Robin	Dillon	nicely	summarizes	the	abstractness	objection	when	she	writes,	concerning	the	Kantian	conception	of	respect	for	persons,	that	it	abstracts	from	all	particularities,	regarding	the	details	of	our	selves	as	contingencies	irrelevant	to	our	intrinsic	moral	worth.	The	morally	significant	feature	of	persons	on	this	view	is	something	abstract	and	generic,	not	what	distinguishes	one	individual	from	another	but	what	makes	us	all	indistinguishably	equal.	An	individual	human	being	is	an	object	of	respect	only	insofar	as	she	is	an	instance	of	the	universal	type,	‘being	with	the	capacity	for	rationally	autonomous	moral	agency.’	It	is,	in	the	words	of	the	categorical	imperative,	the	‘humanity	in	us’	that	matters	morally	and	so	calls	for	respect.	(Dillon	1992:	116)	Because	the	version	of	Kantian	respect	under	scrutiny	here	is	focused	on	an	abstract	feature	that	all	persons	share,	it	is	claimed	that	the	attitude	of	respect	is	“distant,”	“cool,”	“detached,”	as	well	as	being	indiscriminate,	as	if	the	particular	person	who	has	the	abstract	property	now	being	respected	by	one	could	be	switched	out	for	any	other	particular	person	and	one’s	respect	would	remain	exactly	the	same	(and	equally	appropriate).		 There	are	two	possible	approaches	to	this	challenge.	One	is	to	try	to	show	that	Kant’s	conception	of	respect	is	much	less	abstract	and	impersonal	than	scholars	have	claimed	(see	Bagnoli	2003).	The	other	is	to	concede	the	generic	and	
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indiscriminate	character	of	Kantian	respect	but	defend	it	as	a	fitting	reflection	of	nature	of	recognition-respect.	We	are	tempted	by	this	latter	approach.	In	fact,	we	suspect	that	authors	who	demand	a	more	“particularist”	conception	of	recognition-respect	will	find	that	the	latter	ends	up	collapsing	into	practical	love.	If	one	is	impressed	by	the	need	to	distinguish	love	and	respect	(or,	more	generally,	one	moral	emotion	that	brings	people	closer	and	makes	the	agent	adopt	the	other’s	ends	as	her	own	and	another	moral	emotion	that	protects	the	separateness	of	people	and		makes	agent	avoid	treating	others	as	means),	then	one	must	cast	respect	as	indeed	a	rather	abstract	and	indiscriminating	attitude.	This	is	of	course	just	a	sketch	of	a	response.	We	do	not	pretend	to	have	argued	for	it	with	these	rudimentary	remarks;	merely	to	have	pointed	in	the	direction	of	response	to	which	we	are	attracted.			 A	related	challenge	is	that	even	if	Kant’s	phenomenology	of	respect	is	broadly	accurate,	it	cannot	by	itself	be	morally	foundational,	requiring	instead	supplementation	by	more	“pathos-based”	moral	emotions,	such	as	love,	empathy,	and	care	(see	Dillon	1992,	Sherman	1998).	The	objection	may	be	put	impressionistically	as	follows:	an	ethical	system	based	entirely	on	a	force	of	“repulsion”	that	keeps	people	at	a	distance	is	a	somewhat	grim	and	uninviting	system.	Surely	care	and	concern	for	the	happiness	of	others	must	play	a	role	in	a	comprehensive	ethical	theory.		 In	response,	we	can	only	agree	with	the	objector’s	sentiment.	But	we	do	not	agree	that	Kant	has	missed	this	point.	His	very	distinction	between	duties	of	respect	and	duties	of	love	is	indicative	of	his	sensitivity	to	it.	Duties	of	practical	love	include	beneficence	(or	“good-doing”	–	Wholtun)	and	sympathetic	feeling.	The	duty	of	sympathetic	feeling	is	an	“indirect”	duty	in	the	sense	that	fulfilling	it	plays	a	significant	role	in	providing	one	with	information	and	motivation	to	fulfill	one’s	duty	of	beneficence.	Proper	sympathetic	identification	with	another’s	plight	puts	one	in	touch	with	factors	about	her	or	his	situation	that	are	morally	relevant	in	determining	how	one	might	be	of	help.	Kant	claims	that	sympathetic	feeling	is	a	natural	instinct,	which,	when	cultivated,	can	serve	to	motivate	one	to	perform	acts	of	beneficence	that	“representation	of	duty	alone	might	not	accomplish”	(MS	6:457).	So	unlike	duties	of	respect,	fulfilling	one’s	duty	of	beneficence	toward	others	will	typically	involve	sympathetic	feeling.	Importantly,	because	the	duty	of	beneficence	is	an	“imperfect”	duty,	it	allows	for	latitude	in	complying	with	it,	and	so	the	phenomenology	of	beneficence	will	typically	not	involve	a	felt	demand,	or	at	least	not	one	of	the	same	strength	as	experienced	in	cases	of	recognition	respect.	Although	in	cases	of	close	personal	relationships	duties	of	love	and	of	respect	tend	to	“fuse,”	it	is	important	in	Kant’s	scheme	that	the	differences	between	them	not	be	lost	in	one’s	theorizing.	It	remains	that	a	complete	understanding	of	Kant’s	moral	
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phenomenology	requires	a	more	precisely	articulated	picture	of	the	complementary	roles	of	pathos-based	moral	emotions	(paradigmatically:	love)	and	pathos-free	ones	(paradigmatically:	respect).		 A	different	challenge	to	the	present	project	is	that	the	phenomenal	character	of	conscious	experiences	of	respect	is	a	morally	insignificant	aspect	of	respect.	In	one	version,	the	objection	may	be	that	feeling	respect	toward	a	person	is	a	highly	energy-consuming	thing,	requiring	as	it	does	apprehending	the	person	the	right	way	and	framing	one’s	relation	to	her	in	a	very	specific	way.	We	could	certainly	not	be	expected	to	enter	this	emotionally	taxing	state	every	time	we	crossed	a	person	on	the	street.	If	so,	moral	life	cannot	be	governed	by	this	kind	of	state.	Some	other	way	of	negotiating	our	social	life	morally	would	have	to	be	devised.			 Our	tentative	response	has	two	parts.	On	the	one	hand,	we	would	like	to	concede	the	point	about	the	emotional	cost	of	constant	jolting	into	a	state	of	experienced	respect.	What	should	morally	govern	our	interactions	with	others,	on	our	view,	is,	ideally,	a	trained-in	virtue	of	respect	(or	“respectfulness”).	This	virtue	of	respect	is	best	thought	of	as	a	cluster	of	automatized,	unconscious	dispositions,	and	to	that	extent	calls	for	a	psychological,	third-person,	functional-role-based	characterization	rather	than	our	phenomenological,	first-person,	phenomenal-character-based	one.	At	the	same	time,	we	insist	that	while	some	of	the	manifestations	constitutive	of	the	relevant	disposition	are	behavioral,	others	are	experiential,	and	are	just	as	constitutive.	A	person	who	consistently	acted	toward	other	persons	in	all	the	ways	required	by	recognition-respect,	but	whose	internal	experience	as	she	did	so	conformed	to	none	of	the	phenomenological	observations	cited	above,	could	hardly	be	properly	described	as	having	the	virtue	of	respect.	(Thus	a	respectful	zombie	would	appear	to	be	inconceivable!)	To	that	extent,	a	complete	functional	characterization	of	the	virtue	of	respect	presupposes	a	phenomenological	characterization	of	the	experience	of	respect.	It	remains,	however,	that	a	fuller	account	of	the	respective	roles	of	respect-as-experience	and	respect-as-virtue	in	a	Kantian	ethics	would	be	required	for	a	defense	of	the	significance	of	a	phenomenology	of	respect	for	our	grasp	on	moral	action.	
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